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THE SUPREME COURT, 1975 TERM
volving improperly motivated state action it is important to pre-
serve the full force of remedial statutes like Title VII which
implement the congressional commitment to eliminating discrim-
inationY'
2. Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children. -Although
the Supreme Court has hinted in recent years that illegitimacy
may be a suspect classification for equal protection purposes,1
a six-man majority2 firmly rejected this proposition last Term in
Mathews v. Lucas.3 Employing "less than strictest scrutiny," 4
the Court went on to uphold provisions relating to survivors'
benefits of the Social Security Act I that denied one group of
illegitimate children the conclusive presumption of eligibility
given to all other children. 6
The Social Security Act provides that a child cannot obtain
benefits unless he was dependent upon his insured parent at the
time the parent died.7 Most children, however, are not required
to prove actual dependence, for the Act conclusively presumes
the following to be dependent: (i) legitimate children; ' (2)
children able to inherit under the intestacy laws of the state in
which the insured parent died; 1 (3) children whose parents had
gone through a marriage ceremony which was technically in-
0' Even assuming that Title VII is aimed only at purposeful discrimination,
there may be greater justification for erring on the side of overbreadth, see p.
ri9 supra, when a court is structuring evidentiary burdens on the basis of a con-
gressional enactment aimed specifically at eliminating such discrimination than
for adopting a similar approach to all state action under the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection.
'See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (i973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. x64, 172-73 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 7, (1968).
- Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, did not reach the question of whether illegitimacy is a suspect classification,
although some language in the dissent suggests that they thought it was. See
96 S. Ct. 2755, 2769 n.3, 2770 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Instead, the dis-
senters indicated that the statute challenged in Lucas could not even be described
as rationally related to legitimate governmental goals. See note 25 infra.
3 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976).
I See id. at 2764. While Lucas involved an alleged violation of the 5th amend-
ment's due process clause, the constitutionality of federal discriminatory action
is tested against the standards developed with respect to the equal protection clause
of the 14 th amendment. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
5;28 (,973).
'42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(I), (3); id. § 4 16(h)(2), (3) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
o 96 S. Ct. 2767.
S42 U.S.C. § 402 (d) (i) (C) (ii) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
8 All legitimate children are "deemed dependent," id., and children who qualify
under the categories described at text are "deemed legitimate," id. § 4 02(d) (3).
9 Id. § 4 16(h) (2) (A). See also note 67 infra.
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valid;"0 and (4) children whose insured father had acknowledged
in writing his paternity," had been declared by a court to be the
child's father, 2 or had been ordered by a court to provide sup-
port.13 An illegitimate child not covered by ,these presumptions
cannot obtain survivors' benefits unless he can establish that the
insured parent was living with him ' or contributing to his sup-
port '5 when the parent died.
This -scheme was challenged by Ruby and Darin Lucas, the
illegitimate children of Belmira Lucas and James Cuffee. Cuffee,
who was insured under the Act, and Lucas had begun living to-
gether in 1948, and Ruby and Darin were born in I953 and i96o
respectively. The family remained together until 1966, when the
parents separated, the children staying with their mother. When
Cuffee died two years later, Ruby and Darin applied for sur-
vivors' benefits. The application was denied because they fell
into none of the categories of children presumed dependent and
had not been living with or receiving support from Cuffee at the
time of his death.'6
After exhausting administrative remedies, -the Lucases ap-
pealed the adverse agency decision to 'the district court. That
court held that the contested classification scheme was a denial
of equal protection because it reflected the view that legitimate
children were more entitled to ,support than were illegitimate
children, 17 and was therefore unsupported by a permissible gov-
ernmental interest' s
In an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court
"°Id. § 402(d) (3); id. § 4 16(h) (2) (B).
1 Id. § 402(d) (3); id. § 4 16(h) (3) (C) (i) (I).
12 Id. § 402 (d) (3); id. § 4 16(h) (3) (C) i) (II).
'3 Id. § 402(d) (3); id. § 4 6(h) (3) (C) (i) (III).
14 That a child is considered dependent on the insured parent if he lives with the
parent might also be characterized as a presumption, since a child living with a
parent is not necessarily dependent on the parent.
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 402 (d) (3) (I97O) ; id. § 416(h) (3 ) (C) (ii). These provisions
have been the subject of much litigation. Only the district court in Lucas, however,
held that they were unconstitutional. See Watts v. Veneman, 476 F.2d 529 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Perry v. Richardson, 440 F.2d 677 (6th Cir. 1971);
Norton v. Weinberger, 39o F. Supp. 1084 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd sub nor., Norton
v. Mathews, 96 S. Ct. 277X (1976); Adams v. Weinberger, No. 73-C-633 (E.D.N.Y.
'974).
16 See 96 S.Ct. at 2755-61. It was not contested that Cuffee was the father of
the Lucas children, see id. at 276o, or that the children met the age and marital
status requirements for children's benefits, see 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (I), (3) (1970 &
Supp. IV 1974).
"7 See Lucas v. Secretary of HEW, 390 F. Supp. 1310, 1320-21 (D.R.I. i971).
"s Id. The district court also concluded that illegitimacy is a suspect classifica-
tion, see id. at 1319, but held that strict scrutiny was not necessary to strike down
the contested classification, see id. at 1320.
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reversed. 9 It first held that because illegitimacy is not a suspect
classification, something "less than strictest scrutiny" was ap-
propriate.2 0 The Court accepted as permissible the Government's
explanation of the purpose of the statutory scheme - to pro-
vide survivors' benefits only to children who had been dependent
on an insured parent at the time of the parent's death2' - and
concluded that Congress could adopt statutory presumptions to
further administrative convenience in implementing this pur-
pose.2 2 The provisions denying the Lucas children a presump-
tion of dependency 2 3 were distinguished from legislation struck
down in other cases concerning illegitimacy in that they did not
operate to prevent any child who was dependent at the time his
parent died from receiving benefits; 2 the statutory classifica-
tions determining which children would be conclusively pre-
sumed dependent at -the parent's death were permissible because
they were "reasonably related to the likelihood" of such depen-
dency.2
10 96 S. Ct. at 2767. Immediate appeal to the Supreme Court was taken
under 28 U.S.C. § 1252. See 96 S.Ct. at 2760.
20 96 S.Ct. at 2764. The Court implied that the level of scrutiny employed in
Lucas was the same as that employed in two sex discrimination cases, see Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (concurring opinions of Stewart, J.
and Powell, J.); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (majority opinion), cited at
96 S. Ct. at 2764, which evidently applied middle level scrutiny, greater than
that under the rational basis test but less than strict scrutiny, see Gunther, The
Supreme Court, z971 Term- Foreword: It Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. RaV. 1, 32-
35 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 55, 1i6 (1973). But
the Court may in fact use lower level scrutiny to review classifications based on
legitimacy than it uses in sex discrimination cases, for in refusing to subject legis-
lation discriminating against illegitimates to strict scrutiny, the Court relied in part
on its view that this discrimination is less suspect than that against women, see
p. 127 & note 34 infra. Moreover, the Court has struck down discrimination on the
basis of sex which closely resembled the discrimination in Lucas. See Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), distinguished at 96 S. Ct. at 2766.
2196 S. Ct. at 2763.
12 Id. at 2764.
22 The Court recognized that Lucas involved discrimination on the basis of
illegitimacy even though not all illegitimate children were burdened. See id. at 2762
& n.ii. This discrimination is easy to describe: certain illegitimate children will be
required to prove dependence and, further, may be denied benefits, while legitimate
children in identical circumstances except for their legitimacy need not prove de-
pendence and will receive benefits.
24 See id. at 2765.
2 Id. at 2764; see id. at 2766. The dissent argued that the distinction between
Lucas and Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974), see pp. 129-31 & notes 46 to
63 infra, was not constitutionally relevant, see 96 S. Ct. at 2767-68 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) and that the governmental interest in using conclusive presumptions to
further administrative convenience was not sufficient to outweigh the discrimination
1976]
HeinOnline -- 90 Harv. L. Rev.  125 1976-1977
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
In refusing to subject the legislation under consideration to
its "strictest scrutiny," 2 the Court stated that it was "adher-
[ing]" to the view it expressed in Labine v. Vincent,' 7 the only
decision prior to Lucas in which the Court found discrimination
on the basis of legitimacy constitutional." But the level of
scrutiny employed in Labine, which concerned a discriminatory
state intestacy law, may have been unique. In a curious opinion
by Justice Black, the Court asserted that such state statutes are
limited only by "specific constitutional guarantee[s]," 2' which
it strongly suggested did not include "the vague generalities of
the Equal Protection Clause." 30 Subsequent decisions concern-
ing illegitimacy have required a showing of a more substantial
connection between the challenged discrimination and the purpose
it allegedly serves." Moreover, nothing in these later opinions
suggests that the Court had already decided that strict scrutiny
against illegitimates in the classifications chosen, see id. at 2768-70 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
26 96 S. Ct. at 2764.
27 401 U.S. 532 (I97I).
28 Supreme Court decisions striking down classifications concerning illegitimacy
are Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (I974) (denial of Social Security benefits
to certain illegitimate children of disabled persons) ; New Jersey Welfare Rights
Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 61g (1973) (per curiam) (denial of state welfare assistance
to most families with illegitimate children) ; Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (I973)
(per curiam) (legitimate but not illegitimate children allowed to sue for parental
support) ; Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (illegitimate children
did not share equally with legitimate children in workmen's compensation recovery
for the death of parent); Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968)
(parents of legitimate but not illegitimate children allowed to sue for wrongful
death of child); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (2968) (legitimate but not illegiti-
mate children allowed to sue for wrongful death of parent).
29 401 U.S. at 538-39.
aOld. at 539-40. The Court in Labine indicated that it was applying a level
of scrutiny below that of the "rational basis" test. See id. at 536 n.6.
"1 See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974) (no evidence that
children presumed eligible are less likely to present spurious claims than those not
eligible); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (973) (per curiam) (state interest in
problem of proof of paternity may not be used "to shield otherwise invidious dis-
crimination"); see also Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 273 (974)
(state interest is not "compelling") ; id. at 175 (classification bears "no significant
relationship" to legitimate objectives); id. at 172 ("at a minimum the statutory
classification must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose").
Prior to Labine, the Court clearly used a rational basis test in one of its illegiti-
macy decisions, see Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (2968).
In its other pre-Labine decision, the level of scrutiny employed was not made
clear, compare Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 7, (1968) ("end result is whether
the line drawn is a rational one"), with id. (while "we give great latitude to the
legislature in making classifications . . . . We . . . have not hesitated to strike
down an individious classification," citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1952)).
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might not be applicable to statutes which discriminate against
illegitimates. Indeed, in one decision subsequent to Labine, the
Court stated that it did not need to "reach" the argument that
illegitimacy was a suspect classification.3 2
Despite its refusal to grant illegitimacy the status of a suspect
classification, the majority did observe that "the law has long
placed the illegitimate child in an inferior position relative to the
legitimate . . . particularly in regard to obligations of support
or other aspects of family law."3 Ironically, Lucas confirmed
the Court's observation by rejecting the propriety of strict scru-
tiny in the context of a statute operating to burden illegitimates
in precisely that area of the law. Whether or not discrimination
against illegitimates has ever "approached the severity or perva-
siveness of the historic legal and political discrimination against
women and Negroes," 34 the fact remains that illegitimates are
relegated at birth to a disadvantaged status and lack the abiilty
to protect their interests through a political process which his-
torically has subjected them to severe deprivations during child-
hood.3 5
While Lucas clearly holds that legislation discriminating on
the basis of legitimacy is subject to less scrutiny than is legis-
lation which discriminates on the basis of race or national originS6
the opinion is ambiguous as to the precise level of scrutiny that
was applied.3 7 One critical issue, the Court implied, was whether
the scheme rendered the Social Security Act underinclusive 38 -
that is, whether it conclusively denied benefits to children who
2 See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631-32 (1974).
33 96 S. Ct. at 2762.
34 Id.
11 See generally C. FoOTE, R. LEvY & F. SANDER, CASES & MATERIALS oN FAmIY
LAW x6-169 (1966) & 1-18 (Supp. 197i).
6 See p. 125 & note 20 supra.
" See 96 S. Ct. at 2767 (calculations of likelihood of dependency are not "un-
founded, or so indiscriminate as to render the statute's classifications baseless") ;
id. at 2764 (classifications are permissible "because they are reasonably related to
likelihood of dependency," where benefiting dependents is objective of statutory
provisions); id. at 2766 ("[W]e cannot say that the factors giving rise to pre-
sumption of dependency lack any substantial relation to likelihood of actual de-
pendency."). See also note 20 supra.
38 The Court did not use the term "underinclusive" in its examination of the
challenged scheme. However, the Court's description of the effect of the scheme is
equivalent to the manner in which the Court distinguished between "underinclu-
siveness" and "overinclusiveness" in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637
(1974). Moreover, the Court accepted the district court's characterization of
the contested classification scheme as "overinclusive" but not "underinclusive," see
96 S. Ct. at 276o-61.
The district court's characterization, however, was with respect to a statutory
objective which it considered impermissible. See 39o F. Supp. at 1319-20.
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were within the purpose of the statute 9 The Court reasoned
that because the burdened children, those to whom none of the
presumptions of dependency were applicable, could still obtain
Social Security benefits upon a showing of actual dependency,4"
the contested classification scheme was not underinclusive.41 This
distinguished Lucas from previous cases holding discrimination
against illegitimates unconstitutional, because in those cases at
least some illegitimate children were conclusively denied equal
entitlement ,to benefits.42
Of course, whether a classification -scheme is underinclusive,
or otherwise -irrational, depends on the objective against which it
is measured.43 In characterizing the contested statutory scheme
as intended to benefit only children dependent on the insured
parent at the time the parent died, the Lucas Court ensured that
the classifications were not underinclusive. Had -the Court found
instead that Congress intended to provide survivors' benefits
to all children who had a right to support from an insured par-
ent 44 or who might have become dependent on him, the scheme
would have been underinclusive; some illegitimate children with-
in this purpose could not have obtained benefits. Thus, inherent
" See 96 S. Ct. at 2764-65. The Court left open the possibility that the provi-
sions in Lucas would have been upheld even if they were somewhat underinclusive.
Underinclusiveness has not always been fatal. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749
(,975) (upholding classification resulting in denial of benefits to certain persons
within purpose of Social Security Act).
4 See pp. 123-24 supra. See also Norton v. Weinberger, 390 F. Supp. XO84,
io89 (D. Md. 1975) ("Even the hypothetical child who is conceived prior to his
father's death but who is born afterwards, will recover if, at the time of his death,
the father was living with the then-pregnant mother or was contributing to her
support. See Wagner v. Finch, 413 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1967).").
41 See 96 S. Ct. at 2765.
42 See note 28 supra. Although phrased in terms of equal protection analysis,
the inquiries in both Lucas and Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (974),
bearing on over- and underinclusiveness, closely resemble irrebuttable presump-
tion analysis under the due process clause, see generally, Note, The Irrebuttable
Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1534 (2974). See
Jiminez v. Weinberger, supra, at 639 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). When an irrebut-
table presumption imposes a burden, the major concern under this analysis is
its overinclusiveness, because persons included within the presumption have no
opportunity to escape the burden. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S.
632, 645-46 (i974); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 43 U.S. 5o8, 512-X5
(1973). When a classification scheme containing an irrebuttable presumption con-
fers a benefit, its underinclusiveness would analogously be scrutinized, because
persons excluded from the presumption have no opportunity to obtain the benefit.
" See generally, Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection,
82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
4" The Government had in fact argued before the district court that this was
the purpose of the contested provisions, see 390 F. Supp. at 1320 (quoting Brief of
Defendant in Response to Brief of Amicus Curiae at 2-3). The appellee Lucas
children argued this purpose before the Supreme Court, see 96 S. Ct. at 2763.
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in the Court's determination of the Act's purpose was a logical
barrier to proof of the contention that -the government had
denied -to certain illegitimate children entitlement "to needed
support . . . simply because [each child's] natural father has
not married its mother." 45
The significance of the Court's characterization of the pur-
pose of survivors' benefits for children is underscored by a com-
parison of Lucas with Jimenez v. Weinberger,4 6 in which the Court
held underinclusive and unconstitutional provisions in the Social
Security Act relating to benefits for children of disabled persons
insured under the ActY The presumptions of eligibility in Jimenez
for certain children of disabled persons were virtually identical
to those in Lucas for certain surviving children.48 Furthermore,
in both cases, children not covered by a presumption had to prove
they were dependent on the insured parent at the time the event
triggering entitlement occurred: in Jimenez, at the time the parent
became disabled,49 in Lucas, at the time the parent died.50 Had
the Court in Jimenez characterized the purpose of the disability
provisions as to benefit children dependent at the time the parent
became disabled -the purpose that would have been analogous
to that found in Lucas - the Jimenez classifications would not
have been underinclusive. All children who had been dependent
when the insured became disabled could have obtained benefits.
Admittedly, some illegitimate children who had become depen-
dent only later would have been denied benefits. But they would
have had no cause for complaint; by hypothesis, they would
not have been intended beneficiaries of the Social Security Act.
In Jimenez, however, the Court rejected the argument that
Congress intended to provide benefits only to children who were
dependent on the insured at the time he was disabled.51 Rather,
the Court concluded that all dependents of a disabled wage earner
are within the purview of the Social Security Act,52 including
45 96 S. Ct. at 2763 (quoting Gomez v. Perez, 409 US. 535, 538 (,973) (per
curiam)).
46 47 US. 628 (1974).
47 1d. at 637. See 42 U.S.C. § 4 16(h)( 3 )(B) (1970).
48 See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (i) (C), (3) (1970 & Supp. IV z974) (all legitimate chil-
dren presumed dependent whether parent is dead or disabled) ; compare id. § 4 16(h)
(3) (C) (presumptions for certain illegitimate children of deceased insured) with id.
§ 416(h) (3) (B) (presumptions for certain illegitimate children of disabled in-
sured).
4 9 See id. § 416(h) (3) (B) (ii).
10 See id. § 416(h) (3) (C) (ii).
'" See 417 U.S. at 634-35. This purpose was not argued before the Court in
Jimenez; rather, it was the only purpose of which the Court could conceive that
was consistent with the classification scheme under challenge, see id. at 634.
12 See id. at 633-34.
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illegitimate children not dependent at the time of disability who
later became dependent.1
3
The Court's acceptance in Lucas of a narrow legislative pur-
pose analogous to that which it had rejected in Jimenez cannot
be explained by differences in the language of the provisions
contested in these cases; " the operative terms were entirely
parallel." Nor can it be explained by a difference in legislative
history. Sources cited in Lucas as consistent with a narrow pur-
pose were equally applicable to the sections of the Social Security
Act challenged in Jimenez.56
Instead, the Court's opinions in Jimenez and Lucas indicate
that it will usually defer to the Government's choice of purpose. 7
In Lucas, the Court accepted "at face value" the purpose that the
Government had put forth and "authenticate[d] . . .by refer-
ence to the explicit language of the Act . . .and by reference
to legislative history . 8... , Similarly, in Jimenez, the Court
adopted as the primary purpose of disability benefits a position
that had been consistently argued by the Government."0 Never-
theless, the Court's deference to the Government's articulation
of purpose is not total. In Jimenez, the children won because the
Court decided that the statute was inconsistent with the secondary
purpose proffered by the Government, the prevention of spurious
"' See id. at 636.
" The Court may have been predisposed to find a broad purpose in Jimenez
because of the peculiar situation of the Jimenez petitioners. The Jimenez children
had been born after their father became disabled; therefore, they could never
prove they had been dependent at the time of disability. However, when they
applied for children's benefits, they were living with their father, as they had all
their lives. The Court may have thought it particularly unfair to construe a nar-
row purpose which would exclude some currently dependent children merely be-
cause they were born after their father became disabled.
See p. 129 & note 48 supra.
56 The Lucas Court cited excerpts from two congressional reports in support
of its choice of purpose. The first was House-Senate Conference Report on the
1965 Amendments to the Social Security Act, iii CONG. REC. 18383, 18387 (i965),
cited at 96 S. Ct. at 2763 n.i4. In Jimenez, the Court had apparently relied on this
passage for the broad purpose there adopted, see 4X7 U.S. at 634 n.3. But in Lucas,
it characterized the same passage as only a "partial description of the actual effect"
of the presumptions of dependency, see 96 S. Ct. at 2764 n.14.
The second, S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3io (1965), cited at 96 S. Ct.
at 2763, is equally applicable to the Jimenez situation, but was not cited in the
Jimenez opinion. Expanding on the Court's reproduction of the passage, it reads:
"[the program] is intended to provide benefits to replace the support lost by a
child when his father retires, dies, or becomes disabled." (emphasis added).
" Even the Lucas dissenters accepted the Government's interpretation of the
purpose of survivors' benefits for children. See 96 S. Ct. at 2768 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
5
s Id. at 2763.
59 See 417 U.S. at 633-34.
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claims."° Moreover, the Lucas Court suggested that its deference
to the Government's position could be overcome by a sufficiently
strong showing based on statutory structure or legislative his-
tory."'
Because the Government can always offer a rationale for a
statute that will render it not underinclusive, subsequent judicial
means-ends scrutiny is potentially circular. The outcome of equal
protection analysis thus may turn on whether the factors are
present which persuade the Court to abandon its deference to
the Government.
Of course, a choice of purpose which eliminates potential
underinclusiveness in a statutory classification may render the
statute overinclusive. For instance, under the statute challenged
in Lucas, most children who are not in fact dependent when
their parents die nonetheless receive benefits because they qualify
under one of the statutory presumptions of entitlement.12 The
Court made it clear that such overinclusiveness did not, in itself,
require that the scheme be found constitutionally defective. 3
Yet While the issue was nominally the degree to which each of the
presumptions employed accurately identified dependent children,
6 4
the Court was in fact satisfied with being able to articulate a
conclusory rationale for each presumption. 5
The Court explained that its abbreviated inquiry was promp-
ted by deference to Congress, which had "tailored [the] statu-
tory classifications in accordance with its calculations of the
likelihood of actual dependency." 66 Yet it is clear that at least
the classification regarding ability to inherit under intestacy laws
was never intended by Congress to be an indication of dependency.
Read literally, the Social Security Act does not presume illegiti-
mate intestate heirs dependent. Rather, the Court itself found
it necessary to interpret the Act that way to avoid an anomaly
that might have been created by other provisions relating to
illegitimates.67 Therefore, the classifications in Lucas were not
60 See id. at 634.
6' See 96 S. Ct. at 2763 n.14.
12 See pp. X23-24 supra.
" See 96 S. Ct. at 2764.
4 See id.
G" See id. at 2766 (quoting Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F. Supp. i17, 1128 (D.
Md. 1973)).
66 96 S. Ct. at 2767.
67 Under a literal reading of the statute, illegitimate intestate heirs are merely
potentially eligible for benefits; they must prove dependence. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2)
(A) (197o) includes illegitimate intestate heirs within the definition of "child of
an insured," the broadest class of potential recipients, but nowhere in the statute
are these children automatically presumed legitimate or dependent. For many
years, this was the only provision concerning illegitimate children. Thus, no illegit-
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"tailored" in so precise a manner as the Court assumed; nor
should it be expected that complicated and repeatedly amended
social welfare legislation will be. Where the end result is discrim-
ination against a group like illegitimates, the Court need not defer
solely for fear of displacing conscious congressional policy choices.
Nevertheless, Lucas suggests that the Court will generally de-
fer to the Government's choice of purpose and presumed empirical
judgments by Congress in cases concerning illegitimacy, thereby
disclaiming responsibility for protecting illegitimates from the ves-
tiges of severe historical discrimination. It is perplexing that
this position was reached in the context of differential treatment
that can be rationalized only by resort to such tenuous and de-
ferential analysis.
3. Economic Regulation. - In Morey v. Doud,1 the Supreme
Court invalidated an Illinois statute exempting the American
Express Company by name from a general regulatory scheme.
Morey was the only case by the Warren Court to overturn busi-
ness regulations on equal protection grounds.' Last Term, in a
per curian decision, the Court eliminated this anamoly by ex-
pressly overruling Morey in City of New Orleans v. Dukes.3
In 1972, New Orleans barred all pushcart vendors from doing
imate children who were not intestate heirs could receive benefits, see Scalzi v.
Folsom, 156 F. Supp. 838 (D.R.I. 1957), and only legitimate children were pre-
sumed dependent, see id. § 402(d)(3).
In i96o, § 4 16(h) (2) (B), see pp. 123-24 & note io supra, was added. Pub. L. No.
86-788, § 208(b), 74 Stat. 968 (i96o). And in 1965, § 416(h) (3), see p. 124 & note
ii supra, was added. Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 339(a), 79 Stat. 409 (1965). These
new provisions not only allowed many illegitimate children who were not in-
testate heirs to receive benefits but presumed them legitimate and thus not required
to prove dependence. However, children included in § 416(h) (2) (A) were expressly
excluded from the operation of these new provisions. An anomaly resulted: children
who qualified under both § 4 16(h) (2) (A) and the new provisions had to prove
dependence, while those children falling only within the new sections did not. In
order to correct this anomaly, the Supreme Court construed the Social Security Act
as presuming all intestate heirs legitimate and thus dependent, see 96 S. Ct. at
2766 n.17; Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631 n.2 (1974).
Since the provision on intestate heirs was intended only to define the word
"child" as used in the Act, it is not surprising that, apart from the extent to which
it subsumes factors included in other presumptions, it is not a good indicator of
dependence. The only rationale which the Court offered for this presumption was
quite tenuous: intestacy laws would embody the popular view within a jurisdiction
as to how a parent would divide his wealth among his children, which in turn would
reflect the popular conception of parental obligations, which in turn would affect
actual parental support at least sometime during the child's life, see id. at 2766-77.
354 U.S. 457 (1957).
G 0. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoNsTiTUTIoNAL LAW 678 (9th ed.
1975).
3 96 S. Ct. 2513 (976).
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